On the Analysis of Byte-Granularity Heap Randomization

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Abstract—Heap randomization, in general, has been a well-trodden area; however, the efficacy of byte-granularity randomization has never been fully explored as misalignment raises various concerns. Modern heap exploits often abuse the determinism in word alignment, and modern CPU architecture better supports unaligned access (since Nehalem). Based on such new developments, we conduct an in-depth analysis of evaluating the efficacy of byte-granularity heap randomization in three folds: (i) security effectiveness, (ii) performance impact, and (iii) compatibility analysis to measure deployment cost. Security discussion is based on 20 CVE case studies. To measure performance details, we conduct cycle-level microbenchmarks and report that the performance cost is highly concentrated to edge cases depending on the L1-cache line. Based on such analysis, we design and implement an allocator suited for byte-granularity heap randomization. On the negative side, our analysis suggests that byte-granularity heap randomization has high deployment cost due to various implementation conflicts. We enumerate the problematic compatibility issues using Coreutils, Nginx, and ChakraCore benchmarks.

Index Terms—Heap, Exploit, Unaligned Access, Randomization, Allocator.

1 INTRODUCTION

Memory corruption vulnerabilities are widely exploited as attack vectors. According to the recent statistics from the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) database, the majority of the arbitrary code execution exploits that have a CVSS score greater than 9.0 are caused by heap-based vulnerabilities such as use-after-free and heap overflow [32]. Recent vulnerability reports [36] also suggest that most of the usefully exploitable bugs are typically caused by heap corruptions. So far, numerous heap randomization approaches have been proposed. However, some remnants of vulnerabilities still survive due to their exploitation primitives. In modern heap exploit attacks, type confusions between integer-pointer or float-pointer are often utilized [26], [27]. To trigger such confusion, a crafted object/pointer spraying technique is required. These advanced heap exploitation techniques often take advantage of the fact that although the overall heap layout is unpredictable, the pointer-width alignment of any heap chunk is deterministic (the chunk address is always divisible by sizeof(void*)).

Several heap-related defense approaches, including [37], [38], [39], [51], [56], [57], [60], have provided insights into making the heap exploitation more difficult by effectively randomizing the heap layout. However, previous methods avoids reducing this randomization granularity by byte-level as it breaks the “CPU word alignment” for heap memory access. For example, [57], [68] and [39] randomizes the heap layout by prepending a random sized dummy memory space between each heap chunk; however, the randomized distance between heap chunk is guaranteed to be divisible by sizeof(void*) to respect the CPU word granularity memory alignment. In the case of [43], the paper suggests the importance of reducing the memory allocation granularity for heap defense. However, the paper considers the pointer-width granularity (8-bytes) as the smallest possible allocation in their discussion. The main reason why previous work avoided byte-granularity randomization is that because modern hardware and software are often optimized to specific memory alignment.

Recently, major CPU vendors such as Intel and ARM recently started putting efforts to support arbitrarily misaligned (byte-granularity) memory access from hardware level [42], [46]. Based on such development, we conduct in-depth analysis on the efficacy of byte-granularity heap randomization in three folds. First, we analyze the security impact of adopting byte-granularity randomness to heap chunks. Second, we conduct cycle-level microbenchmark and memory intensive application benchmarks to reveal the performance impact of byte-granularity randomization. Finally, we analyze various compatibility problems that byte-granularity randomness can cause.

For evaluation purpose, we design and implement an allocator which adopts byte-granularity randomness to heap chunk allocation with specific exception handling and optimization. We name our allocator “Randomly Unaligned Memory Allocator (ra-malloc)”. Performance regarding chunk management and allocation speed of ra-malloc does not outperform traditional heap allocators. However, ra-malloc leverages architecture specifics and reduces memory access penalty of byte-granularity heap randomization.

1. To quote the paper: “memory managers at all levels should use finer memory allocation granularity for better security”
To measure the performance impact of ra-malloc, we apply various allocators (ra-malloc, tcmalloc, dlmalloc, jemalloc and ottomalloc) to SPEC2006 and compare their benchmark results. To investigate compatibility problem of byte-granularity heap randomization, we use Coreutils utilities test suite, Nginx web server test suite, and ChakraCore JavaScript engine test suite. We discuss the various issues regarding compatibility in section 5 and summarize negative analysis results as limitations in section 6.

The contributions of this paper include the followings:

- This is the first work that fully analyzed the pros and cons of byte-granularity heap randomization.
- We conducted in-depth experiments and security analysis caused by byte-granularity randomness.
- We design and implement a memory allocator (ra-malloc) that optimizes the byte-granularity heap randomization on recent Intel architecture.

## 2 Security Analysis of Byte-Granularity Heap Randomization

In modern heap exploitation, achieving direct manipulation of code pointer is unlikely due to the state-of-the-art compiler defenses such as VTGuard, pointer encryption, and VT-read-only checks [62]. As a result, the surviving remnants of heap exploitation techniques often target data pointer and involve convoluted steps of pointer manipulation to complete the exploit. The key procedure is controlling the program to use the attacker-crafted non-pointer values as an intact pointer. Exploitation of typical heap vulnerabilities such as use-after-free, out-of-bounds access (including heap overflow), type confusion and uninitializing access mostly involves multiple steps of invalid pointer dereference to trigger information leakage, achieve arbitrary memory access and finally, execute arbitrary code.

Traditional heap spray places a huge amount of NOP-sled and shellcodes into predictable heap address as direct code pointer manipulation was easy, however, the goal of modern heap spray is more focused on placing crafted pointers around out-of-bounds heap area. Because heap spray allows an attacker to control a broad range of heap chunk, malicious pointer-spraying could be a threat without any (for 32-bit address space) or with only limited (for 64-bit address space) information disclosure. In this section, we first clarify the attack model and assumptions, then discuss the security effectiveness of byte-granularity heap randomization in three terms: (i) successful triggering of heap vulnerability (ii) information leakage attacks (iii) bypassing byte-granularity heap randomization.

### 2.1 Successful Triggering of Heap Vulnerabilities

Any triggering step of heap vulnerabilities that occurs due to out-of-bounds access are affected by byte-granularity heap randomization. For example, the first use of dangling-pointer in use-after-free guarantees to crash any application with 87.5% (75% in 32-bit) probability as there are eight (four in 32-bit) possible outcomes of the misinterpreted pointer alignment.

Consider the exploitation steps of use-after-free: (i) an object is freed and a dangling pointer is created, (ii) the attacker places a crafted object around the dangling-pointed memory region, and (iii) the program uses the dangling pointer as if the original object member variables (pointer member variables) are still intact thus using attacker’s crafted pointer. These steps imply that there are two independent heap chunk allocations around the dangling-pointed heap area. Although the address of each heap chunks is random, if the allocation granularity is bigger than the pointer-width, an attacker can spray the heap and overlap the fake object and dangling-pointer thus successfully trigger the use-after-free without pinpointing the exact memory addresses.

This effectiveness can be described by depicting a simplified example. Figure 1 depicts an example case of dereferencing a dangling pointer (to access a pointer member variable) after attacker launches a pointer-spray attack. For simplicity, let’s assume attacker wants to hijack a pointer into 0xdeadbeefcafebabe and there are five unpredictable cases of dangling pointers which will be randomly decided at runtime.

In Figure 1a, an attacker can hijack the target pointer member variable with a very high chance because the heap randomization follows word-granularity. The attacker can spray the eight-byte sequence “DE AD BE EF CA FE BA BE” sufficiently long to defragment the heap region and bypass the randomization. However, in Figure 1b, the randomization is byte-granularity thus the attack fails with 87.5% probability regardless of the spray; unless the pointer is composed with same bytes (we discuss this issue at the end of this section).

The same effectiveness can also be observed from heap overflow situation. In general, randomizing the distance between the source of the out-of-bounds access (buggy buffer) and the adjacent heap object is an effective mitigation approach against heap overflow attack. However, if the heap allocation granularity is bigger than the width of the pointer, the effectiveness of this approach can be reduced regarding pointer manipulation. This can be demonstrated with a hypothetical situation in which the attacker tries to hijack a pointer value inside an adjacent heap object. Figure 2 shows the illustration of such scenario.

In Figure 2a, there are four random heap layout cases of a corrupted buffer and the adjacent heap object. The goal of the attacker is to hijack the benign target pointer (0x44332211 in Figure 2) into his/her malicious pointer (0x88776655 in Figure 2) by overwriting the randomized heap memory. However, the target pointer in the four randomized layouts in Figure 2a can be successfully hijacked with the same attack payload under the assumption that the memory contents are always aligned at multiples of pointer-width. When the address alignment of a pointer variable remains unchanged, the probability of a successful attack will increase as the attacker uses a sufficiently long attack payload. In Figure 2b, the probability of a successful pointer
Fig. 1: Simplified example cases of dereferencing a dangling pointer for Use-After-Free under pointer-spray attack (assuming 0xdeadbeefcafebabe is the crafted pointer). The box in the middle represents dangling pointed object and each row indicates pointer-type member variable. Assume there are five possible dangling pointers due to randomization. For better visualization, the memory dump is shown in big-endian format.

Fig. 2: Randomized heap layout and heap overflow attack. The fifth row from the top is the attacker’s heap overflow data that overwrites the existing memory contents in four different cases. (a) depicts randomized heap layout with word granularity and (b) depicts randomized memory layout with byte-granularity.

hijacking attack remains 25% regardless of the length of the attack payload.

On the other hand, if the attacker can fully control the length and content of the overwritten buffer, and if the attacker can disclose the memory value as an integer, the attacker can increase the length of overwritten buffer one by one and find out the byte-granularity offset information between buffer and target data (e.g., if 0x44332211 becomes 0x44332288 with 12 bytes overwrite with 0x88, the offset is 11 bytes).

The effectiveness of byte-granularity heap randomization is not specific to particular heap vulnerabilities. We emphasize that any exploitation step which involves the use of crafted pointer upon out-of-bounds heap access is affected. For example, exploitation of heap overflow, uninitialized heap access vulnerability also involves out-of-bounds heap access [8], [13] thus affected by byte-granularity heap randomization.

So far, the security effectiveness of byte-granularity heap randomization seems small, as one out of eight (or four) triggering attempts will succeed. However, this probability of single dereferencing is not the probability of a successful attack. Modern heap exploitation usually involves multiple combination and repetition of such bug triggering. According to Google Project-Zero, successful exploitation of CVE-2015-3077 required up to 31 times of pointer confusion. As heap exploitation involves multiple uses of crafted pointers, the defense probability will increase exponentially. However exact calculation of defense probability based on a number of the crafted pointer is unrealistic as modern
heap exploitation usually achieves complete information leakage capability in the middle of the exploitation. In next subsection, we discuss the effectiveness of byte granularity heap randomization considering information leakages.

### 2.2 Information Leakage

Information leakage vulnerabilities are typically discovered in software that implements ECMAScript [29] parsers including ChakraCore, V8, ActionScript, and Spider Monkey. It is well established that complete disclosure of memory renders all the randomness-based exploit defenses ineffective. In this subsection, we analyze the impact of byte-granularity heap randomization over various types of information leakage attempts.

According to previous insights of past research, there are information disclosure attacks based on side-channels which do not leverage memory corruption [30], [41], [45], [52], [54], [63], [64], [67]. Memory randomization does not affect such attacks. However, some information disclosure attacks are based on memory corruption. In such case, byte-granularity randomization could affect information leakage as well. We analyzed the impact of byte-granularity randomization for such cases.

One of the information leakage primitive found in real-world CVEs is often achieved by OOB (Out-Of-Bound read/write) vulnerability. Such OOBs can be divided into several types: (i) direct disclosure of arbitrary memory contents without involving use of fake pointer, (ii) partial disclosure of non-arbitrary memory, and (iii) indirect disclosure of memory contents. Example case of (i) would be literal array (e.g., string) based OOB [3], [10]. If the OOB is achieved by such size-corrupted array (e.g., string with negative size) and the memory content of size-corrupted array is directly readable by the attacker, byte-granularity heap randomization has no benefit over existing coarse-grained heap randomization. Attacker can read any heap region starting from the OOB heap by giving arbitrary substring index and length (e.g., leakedarray.substr(0x7fff4000 - [leakedarray address], 100) to read 100 bytes from arbitrary address 0x7fff4000).

On the other hand, in the case of (ii) and (iii), heap allocation granularity can affect the information disclosure attempt. For example, size-shrink based OOB [12] allows an attacker to overread out-of-bound heap buffer. In such case, attacker can read memory contents adjacent to the end of
heap buffer. In order to achieve complete memory access capability, an attacker hijacks an object that has backstore pointer\(^4\). Due to heap isolation, spraying arbitrary object at arbitrary heap segment is not straightforward. Figure 3 illustrates such an example case. From Figure 3, information leak requires fake pointer spraying in case attacker cannot place a backstore pointer (\(ptrB\) in the figure) inside directly accessed out-of-bound heap region.

In case the OOB is based on object array, the attacker cannot directly read the memory contents because the type of array element is not a literal but an object. ECMAScript parsers do not provide any syntax that dumps the raw memory contents of an object. Therefore, an additional trick is required to turn such OOB into working information leakage. Based on our analysis, the attacker can spray fake objects around out-of-bound heap area and making the application to use the fake object. Use of such fake object triggers further type confusions and enables the attacker to hijack a backstore pointer. Crafting out-of-bound heap memory layout for proper pointer confusion often requires predictable memory alignment. Figure 4 illustrates such case (CVE-2016-0191) where the information leakage is achieved via object spraying technique. In this exploitation, attacker achieves information leakage primitive by making the ChakraCore confuse the reference of the pointer inside JavaScriptDate object as the pointer of a DataView object. The exploitation repeats spraying the fake DataView object and using the dangling pointer of JavaScriptDate object until two pointers are confused.

In the case of CVE-2016-1677 [19], class type confusion vulnerability enables an attacker to read lower 16 bits of a pointer value inside a particular object. This leaked information (lower 16 bits of a pointer) can be used to significantly reduce the entropy of ASLR for the memory segment pointed by the partially leaked pointer.

In the case of CVE-2016-1665 [18], a miscalculated index value for an object array (Node array in V8) allows out-of-bound object dereferencing that is outside the array. In order to get information leakage with this bug, sophisticated heap spraying is required to place a fake pointer adjacent to this array, which allows him/her to construct his/her own Node object. Later, the program references a short (2-byte word) pointer inside the attacker’s fake object to decide a branch path. In such a case, the branch path of the program is decided by a fake value that is dereferenced by a fake pointer. Similarly, in [20], an attacker is allowed to decide the program control flow depending on the 1-byte data read from the out-of-bounds heap. In [18] and [20], a side channel attack can be applied in order to reveal the referenced bytes as the control flow is affected by such values.

To summarize the analysis, byte-granularity heap randomization does not affect information leakage which directly reveals arbitrary memory contents without involving fake pointers. However, if the information leakage is (i) dependent on illegal use of fake pointers, or (ii) partial, byte-granularity heap randomization hinders the attack.

\(^4\) A leaf pointer that ultimately being used for reading/writing memory. (e.g., “DataView” in Chrome V8).

### 2.3 Bypassing Byte-granularity Randomization

Byte granularity heap randomization guarantees four (or eight) possible cases against any pointer manipulation due to out-of-bounds access. In turn, an attacker who wishes to hijack a single pointer (or any word-unit data), say, with a value of 0x1234567890abcdef, stands a 87.5\% chance of failing in his/her overwrite attempt with pointer spraying (i.e., 0x890abc0badf00de, etc).

Thus, a plausible way of bypassing byte granularity randomization is by constructing the entire chain of the exploit payload with byte-shift-independent values only. A byte-shift-independent value is a word (or doubleword) composed of the same bytes (e.g., 0x9797979797979797 in a 64-bit system or 0x35353535 in a 32-bit system).

At this point, the byte-shift-independent values are always invalid virtual addresses in current 64-bit system. In 32-bit system, such values can be predictable and valid address especially if the attacker allocates a sufficiently large region of the memory (i.e., allocating the lower 1-Gbyte of memory in a 32-bit address space will include an address of 0x35353535).

As the full exploit code is available on the Internet, we enumerate various heap-exploitation cases studies to demonstrate effectiveness and limitation. The case studies are based on publicly disclosed heap memory corruption vulnerabilities [1], [2], [4], [5], [6], [7], [8], [11], [13], [14], [15], [16], [17], [21], [22], [23], [24], [25], [26], [27].

### 3 Case Studies

Quantifying the probability of successful heap vulnerability exploitation is an arduous process and furthermore, proving the correctness of such probability (of successful exploitation) is practically impossible. To analyze the security efficacy of byte-granularity heap randomization, we enumerate various heap-exploitation cases studies to demonstrate effectiveness and limitation. The case studies are based on publicly disclosed heap memory corruption vulnerabilities [1], [2], [4], [5], [6], [7], [8], [11], [13], [14], [15], [16], [17], [21], [22], [23], [24], [25], [26], [27] that enabled attackers to achieve information leakage or arbitrary-code-execution against various software mostly from Pwn2Own contest and Google bug bounty program. Table 1 summarizes overall analysis.

CVE-2013-2729 is a heap vulnerability that existed in Acrobat Reader X. An integer overflow vulnerability occurs while parsing a bitmap image embedded in a PDF document, which eventually leads to out-of-bound heap access. As the full exploit code is available on the Internet, we reproduced the entire attack under debugging environment to see how byte granularity heap randomization hinders the exploitation. The PoC reliably achieves arbitrary code.
execution against 32-bit Acrobat Reader X in Windows 7; however, after we adopt byte-granularity randomness for heap allocation\(^5\), the PoC exploit constantly crashes due to dereferencing the invalid pointer (incorrectly aligned due to byte granularity randomization). However, the program never crashed while processing benign PDF documents.

For example, the debug screen Figure 5a shows an example crash due to out-of-bound heap pointer access (ESI is holding an invalid fake pointer). The value of ESI is 0xF3070F4C, which is a 1-byte shifted value from the intended one (0x070F4C33). This occurs because of the unpredictable change in the pointer-width alignment between the out-of-bound buffer and the target heap chunk. Although this single step of pointer hijacking could be successfully operated in 25% of the cases, the success probability of first information leaking step (leaking a heap pointer) was less than 1% due to multiple needs of out-of-bound fake pointer access.

CVE-2013-0025 is a use-after-free vulnerability that existed in Internet Explorer 8. We reproduced the triggering of use-after-free with proof-of-concept code and debugged the vulnerability. With this vulnerability, a CParaElement object is used by referencing a CDoc object after it has been freed. The dangling pointer of CDoc dereferences the pointer of CParaElement; then, the pointer of CParaElement dereferences the pointer of the C++ virtual table. Finally, the pointer of the virtual table dereferences a function pointer.

From the debugging screen of Figure 5b, there are three successive pointer dereferencing before EIP is changed (e.g., call dword ptr [eax+170h]). The PoC exploit failed the first step of pointer hijacking “mov esi, [eax],” which was supposedly aimed at hijacking the pointer of CParaElement into 0xBEBAFECA (we chose this value for demonstration), which is a sprayed fake pointer value to point fake CParaElement object.

At the bottom right of the debug screen of Figure 5b, there is an allocation log that reports that a heap chunk was yielded at 0x047c128a (2-byte broken alignment). However, the value of the dangling pointer is 0x047c1288 (0-byte broken alignment). Because the randomly broken alignment of the dangling pointer differs from that of the recycled pointer, the hijacked value of ESI becomes 0xFECA0000 (the two zero bytes are remnants from the original object), which was not the intended value. To hijack the EIP with this use-after-free, more fake pointer spraying attacks are required. This vulnerability does not give the attacker any

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\(^5\) by hooking the heap allocation APIs in the AcroRd32.dll import address table
information leakage. Therefore arbitrary code execution can be achieved under two circumstances: (i) attacker can brute-force the address with extensive heap spray in 32-bit address space, (ii) attacker achieves information leak via other independent vulnerability. If the information leakage is enough to disclose entire memory, the randomness is useless, however, if the address prediction is based on extensive heap spray or partial information leakage (leaking few pointers) byte granularity heap randomization becomes effective to hinder pointer hijacking.

CVE-2017-5030 is a V8 out-of-bound access vulnerability which gives information leakage. In this vulnerability, an attacker can achieve literal based information leakage, thus reveal the out-of-bound accessed heap memory contents directly. Using this initial information leakage, the attacker gets useful information which will be later used. Partial information leakage itself cannot achieve arbitrary code execution. Thus attacker triggers heap spraying and pointer confusion techniques to take control over a back-store pointer. Using the hijacked backstore pointer, the attacker places shellcode inside JIT memory segment (which is RWX) and triggers the code execution. Initial information leakage in this exploit does not involve out-of-bound fake pointer access, and the memory content is exposed directly as literals (float type array). Therefore byte-granularity heap randomization has no mitigation effect against this vulnerability.

The memory scanning steps (analyzing the leaked memory contents) in this exploit involves pointer identification technique based on 8-byte alignment. The essence of this technique is looking up the least significant bit of each 8-byte chunks assuming they are word-aligned. If the least significant bit of leaked word is set, attacker assumes it as a pointer (V8 stores pointer in this manner). Figure 6b shows memory dump of V8 and the leaked memory contents from Chrome debugging console while the exploitation is in progress. From the figure, attacker assumes the leaked value 0x000002d2e9106a41 (highlighted with a box) is a pointer based on the observation that least significant byte among the 8-byte is an odd number. The adoption of byte-granularity heap randomization breaks this information leakage analysis as an attacker can no longer assume the 8-byte pointer alignment of out-of-bound heap region. Under the byte-granularity heap randomization, information leakage analysis requires concrete sentinel such as attacker crafted length value.

CVE-2012-4792 is a use-after-free vulnerability that existed in Internet Explorer 8. The vulnerability is caused by reusing a dangling pointer of CButton object after it has been freed. The button object referenced by a dangling pointer in CVE-2012-4792 has a size of 0x86 bytes, and the use-after-free logic de-references this dangling pointer to retrieve VPTR inside the object. The proof of concept (PoC) exploit code hijacks the VPTR pointer inside EAX to 0xB8BECAB0 (the little-endian representation of byte stream CA FE BA BE). The exploit code for 32-bit environment works reliably under randomized heap (under ASLR) due to pointer spraying. However, after byte-granularity heap randomization is applied, 75% of exploit attempt fails to hijack the VPTR as intended. Figure 6a shows the debugging screen and memory allocation log trace of Internet Explorer 8 while the PoC of CVE-2012-4792 is being triggered. From the figure, the allocation request for the attacker’s data yields memory address 0x00323bbb (3-byte distance from pointer-width alignment), which has a different alignment to that of the dangling pointer 0x00323bba (2-byte distance from pointer-width alignment). Because of the discrepancy among these two memory addresses, the hijacked pointer from “mov eax, [edi]” instruction becomes 0x8AFECAB0. The lower byte 0xB8 is the remnant from the original chunk which is not the value controlled by the attacker.

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TABLE 1: Summarized result of case study.
the ChakraCore confuse the reference of the type pointer of a JavaScriptDate object as the data pointer of a DataView object. The proof of concept repeats spraying the fake DataView object and using the dangling pointer of JavaScriptDate object until type field is confused as data. Assuming the heap allocation granularity is higher than pointer-width, the out-of-bound fake-pointer (any valid pointer) access via dangling JavaScriptDate pointer becomes fully reliable. The proof-of-concept repeats triggering the use-after-free indefinitely until the buffer pointer is confused as type pointer of JavaScriptDate object. Breaking the pointer-width allocation granularity will eliminate the reliability of each fake pointer dereferencing steps thus crash the application before any information leakage attempt succeeds.

CVE-2016-1857 is a use-after-free vulnerability that existed in Safari. A dangling pointer of an ArrayPrototype object can be used while processing the internal array of JavaScript. Using pointer spraying technique in a 32-bit environment, the attacker can reliably place fake pointers inside the dangling-pointed heap region and eventually hijack a virtual function call of toString(). The minimal out-of-bound fake pointers required in the proof-of-concept for hijacking control flow is three. The exploit demonstration is foiled under byte-granularity heap randomization as the exploitation depends on fake pointer spraying. In case the environment is 64-bit, exploitation requires additional information leakage vulnerability. If the information leakage is fully available, fake pointer spraying is not necessary thus byte-granularity randomness would be ineffective.

CVE-2016-5129 is a heap-overflow vulnerability that existed in Chrome. Out-Of-Bound read access triggers a pointer corruption, thus initiating the steps for control flow hijacking. The attacker can use fake pointer spraying technique in the 32-bit environment to manipulate the result of the out-of-bound read access to initiate an attacker-intended pointer referencing (there is no proof-of-concept attack for the 64-bit environment). Successive pointer hijacking requires another independent out-of-bound memory access, which relies on pointer-width heap chunk alignment. From the proof-of-concept, two successive use of the out-of-bound fake pointer is required before the attacker can trigger the first information leakage.

CVE-2014-3176 is a heap-overflow vulnerability of Chrome. The vulnerability allows the attacker to trigger out-of-bound access to Array object. The proof-of-concept demonstrates that exploiting this vulnerability requires multiple steps of successive out-of-bound heap access. In particular, the first heap overflow vulnerability corrupts an adjacent Array object. Successfully corrupting the adjacent object triggers an additional use-after-free vulnerability. Using the dangling pointer of Array, the attacker corrupts another ArrayBuffer object allocated via fake object spraying. Finally, successful corruption of the ArrayBuffer object allows the attacker to initiate the out-of-bound memory read/write and disclose partial heap memory contents.

CVE-2016-1653 is an out-of-bound access vulnerability that existed in Chrome. This vulnerability demonstrates an interesting case in which even an arbitrary-memory-read primitive fails to bypass ASLR without extensive heap spray. The vulnerability allows V8 to create a Just-In-Time (JIT) compiled code that accesses an arbitrary memory address (i.e., mov [0xDEADBEEF], 0xCAFEBABE, where 0xDEADBEEF and 0xCAFEBABE are controlled by attacker). The vulnerability allows an attacker to read and write arbitrary memory with arbitrary content. However, this vulnerability cannot bypass ASLR because the target address of out-of-bound access is based on the absolute address (the attacker does not know “where to leak”). To achieve arbitrary code execution using this vulnerability, the attacker used extensive heap spray with a dummy Function objects. Because the allocation granularity of Function object is predictable, the attacker predicted an absolute address of pointer inside a sprayed object and bypassed ASLR. This bypassing of ASLR becomes unreliable if pointer alignment of sprayed object is unpredictable. An attacker cannot inspect sprayed memory contents and decide if the pointer is valid or not, because (i) attacker cannot execute arbitrary JIT code other than arbitrary mov and (ii) the memory contents read by crafted JIT code is unknown from JavaScript context.

CVE-2015-2411 is a memory corruption vulnerability of Internet Explorer 11 originating from an uninitialized heap memory access of a Tree::TextBlock object. Using a fake pointer spraying technique, the attacker makes the fake pointer to be used while the unintended uninitialized access occurs. To abuse this vulnerability, the pointer-width chunk allocation granularity is required, which guarantees the same alignment between the heap spray data and the uninitialized value. Once the uninitialized pointer access is hijacked, additional steps of pointer hijacking are required to hijack the control flow. The exploitation uses extensive fake pointer spraying to hijack the EIP in a 32-bit environment (64-bit exploitation requires partial/full information leak by additional vulnerability).

CVE-2015-1234 is a Time-of-check to time-of-use (TOCTOU) vulnerability that existed in Chrome which causes out-of-bound heap access; it was disclosed during the Pwn2Own 2015 hacking contest. The vulnerability is caused by the insecure use of shared memory between the Chrome native client (NACL sandbox) and the GPU process. The TOCTOU vulnerability of CVE-2015-1234 is exploitable when in the case of a multi-core CPU. Using the TOCTOU vulnerability, the attacker manipulates the buffer length, which results in a heap overflow in the shared memory region. This initial heap-overflow vulnerability is combined with proper heap spraying of an object that yields an arbitrary-memory-read primitive once it is corrupted. A typical object for such a purpose would be an object that has a readable heap pointer and its length. The impact of byte-granularity heap randomization is low in this case as the initially corrupted data is not a pointer, but a length value. Therefore, an attacker can overwrite the length with a value such as 0xFFFFFFFF and bypass the byte-granularity heap randomization.

CVE-2017-0071 is a type confusion vulnerability found in Chakra. An attacker can change the type of float array without making the ChakraCore being aware of it. The type confusion in this vulnerability does not involve out-of-bound heap access, yet it results arbitrary memory read/write primitive. Therefore, in this case, any heap randomization defense including byte-granularity heap randomization has no effect on mitigating the exploitation.
CVE-2016-1017 is a use-after-free vulnerability that existed in Adobe Flash Player. The use-after-free vulnerability in this CVE yields the following primitive to the attacker: “decrementing an arbitrary memory content”. This primitive is not very useful; however, the attacker can trigger a second use-after-free vulnerability in another object by decrementing an object reference counter, which is possible because of the first use-after-free. From the second use-after-free, the attacker can achieve a full memory read/write primitive. As each use-after-free requires fake pointer access from out-of-bound heap region, the exploit requires pointer-width allocation granularity.

CVE-2016-1796 is a heap overflow vulnerability that existed in the OSX libATSServer service. The vulnerability is triggered by the lack of size limit verification before using the memcpX function. The attacker can spray the heap with an object of his/her choice and make one of the sprayed objects adjacent to the buggy heap buffer. A proper choice of heap spraying object allows the attacker to hijack the control flow and start ROP to execute mprotect. Because the vulnerability is used for local privilege escalation, some of the library addresses and offsets are known. Therefore, information leakage is unnecessary in this case. The number of the fake pointer for achieving ROP in this CVE is only one. However, the stack payload of the ROP chain is referenced from the heap spray area; therefore, additional pointer hijacking (stack pivot) is required.

CVE-2016-1016 is a use-after-free vulnerability that existed in Adobe Flash Player. In this CVE, a dangling pointer of a MovieClip object is created. An attacker can directly achieve arbitrary-memory-read primitive by recycling the dangling-pointed free chunk with a custom AS3 object. Information leakage primitive in this vulnerability is powerful enough to bypass any randomization defense. However, out-of-bound fake pointer reference is required to achieve such information leakage primitive. Therefore byte-granularity heap randomization reduces the probability of successful information leakage into one over sizeof(void*).

CVE-2016-0175 is a use-after-free vulnerability that existed in the Windows win32k subsystem. The vulnerability is caused by insecure handling of object reference counters. In CVE-2016-0175, the successful triggering of the use-after-free vulnerability allows an attacker to perform bitwise OR operation with a constant “2” against arbitrary data inside the memory. The arbitrary memory OR primitive is successively used to cause additional heap overflow vulnerabilities, which finally leads an attacker to an arbitrary-memory-read primitive. Exploitation of this use-after-free vulnerability is not dependant to heap alignment except the initial triggering of the use-after-free. Therefore the impact of byte-granularity heap randomization is weak in this case.

CVE-2016-1859 is a use-after-free vulnerability that existed in the Safari web browser. A GraphicsContext object is used in the setPlatformTextDrawingMode function after it has been freed. The successful triggering of the use-after-free vulnerability itself does not allow the attacker to directly change the control flow or disclose arbitrary memory contents. However, the use-after-free yields an arbitrary-memory-write primitive by hijacking a destination pointer that will be used for the memcpy function. Once the arbitrary-memory-write primitive is achieved, the attacker sprays the heap with string objects to achieve the arbitrary-memory-read primitive. Relying on the pointer width heap alignment, the attacker can accurately predict the exact address of one of the string objects among the heap spray and pinpoint the address of member variable. At this point, the attacker can overwrite the length member variable of a string object and partially disclose the out-of-bound heap area exceeding the buffer address of the string. The partial disclosure of the heap memory allows the attacker to extend the information leak step-by-step and ultimately allows full chaining of ROP, which leads to arbitrary code execution.

CVE-2017-2521 is a powerful out-of-bound access vulnerability in WebKit. A JavaScript function setPublicLength fails to check security conditions thus allows increasing the length of an object. The illegally increased length allows out-of-bound heap memory access. In this case, the out-of-bound content is a literal based array which allows direct memory read/write to the out-of-bound heap. Since this vulnerability enables complete information leakage without requiring the use of any fake pointer, byte-granularity heap randomization does not affect in this case.

CVE-2016-0196 is a use-after-free vulnerability that existed in the Windows win32k subsystem. This vulnerability enables local privilege escalation for a non-privileged Windows application. The vulnerability is caused by incorrect reference counting of a WND object. The exploitation of use-after-free in CVE-2016-0196 can be accomplished by completing two exploitation primitives: (i) arbitrary memory read, and (ii) arbitrary memory write. The exploitation requires three successive steps of pointer hijacking before achieving the arbitrary-memory-write primitive. Each of the pointer hijacking steps requires pointer-width alignment.

CVE-2013-0912 is a type confusion vulnerability existed in Chrome. The successful exploitation was demonstrated in Pwn2Own 2013 [33]. Due to the invalid downcast from Element to SVGElement type, the attacker can access out-of-bound heap memory area by using an element which has a smaller size than the supposedly downcasted object. The proof-of-concept exploitation code of this vulnerability uses HTMLUnknownElement (size 96 bytes) object as the downcasting object instead of SVGElement object (size 160 bytes). Because of the shrunk size, an attacker can access 64 bytes of out-of-bound heap area. Proof-of-concept attack code uses heap spray to adjust the heap layout of the out-of-bound region. This vulnerability becomes more complex to exploit under the adoption of byte-granularity heap randomization as the word alignment of sprayed data around out-of-bound region becomes unpredictable. However, as direct information leakage is feasible before any out-of-bound pointer dereferencing, an attacker can bypass the unpredictable alignment with additional memory layout inspection process.

4 Performance Analysis of Byte-Granularity Heap Randomization

As byte-granularity heap randomization inevitably involves CPU-level unaligned or misaligned memory access, we
Fig. 7: Instruction-level microbenchmark result for Intel i7-6500 (SkyLake). The Y-axis represents the time (consumed seconds) for repeatedly executing the unrolled instructions 134,217,728 (0x8000000) times. A stands for Aligned access, U stands for Unaligned access inside cache line, BC stands for unaligned access on Border of (L1) Cache line, BP stands for unaligned access on Border of Pages. We ran the same benchmark for additional 9 Intel CPUs (Core-i5, Xeon, and so forth) and verified similar results in all cases.

start this section by discussing some backgrounds regarding the unaligned access and analyze our findings in the performance and compatibility such as the atomicity and the alignment fault issues involved in the misaligned access. Based on microbenchmark analysis, we design a new memory allocator ra-malloc for efficient byte-granularity randomization. We further show in-depth testing results on ra-malloc using various benchmarks.

4.1 Unaligned Memory Access

The term alignment can be used with many units such as page alignment, object alignment, and word alignment. In this paper, the term alignment specifically refers to the CPU word granularity alignment. Unaligned memory access can be observed in special cases in an Intel-based system (e.g., #pragma pack(1) in the C language, x86 GLIBC I/O buffer handling). However, memory accesses are always encouraged to be aligned at multiples of the CPU word size. The main reason stems from the limited addressing granularity of the hardware. In general, CPU architectures feature a memory bus line with 8-byte addressing granularity; therefore, the retrieval of memory at an unaligned address requires exceptional handling from the hardware viewpoint. Handling such unaligned memory access may involve various performance penalty issues such as a possible delay of store-load forwarding, cache bank dependency, and cache miss. The major penalty induced by unaligned memory access is closely related to the increased number of L1 cache misses. Because the CPU fetches memory contents from a cache with cache line granularity, unaligned memory access that crosses the boundary of two separate cache lines causes both cache lines to be accessed to retrieve a single word, causing a performance penalty.

Other than performance, unaligned memory access also raises concerns regarding memory access atomicity. Atomic memory access is a critical issue in concurrent software development. Multithreaded applications utilize various types of synchronization primitives such as mutex and semaphore. The key primitive of critical section (protected by the lock) is that the execution should be atomic from the perspective of each thread. Unaligned access raises concerns when the application uses thread synchronization, lock-free algorithms, or lock-free data structures, which relies on instruction-level atomicity such as the InterlockedCompareExchange() function. Because single unaligned memory access can split into multiple accesses at the hardware level, the atomicity of memory access may not be guaranteed.

In fact, ARM architecture does not support such atomicity for unaligned access. Even recently, compare-and-swap (CAS) instructions in ARM (e.g., ldrex, strex) fail to operate if the target memory operand is unaligned. This is the major reason we conclude byte-granularity heap randomization is yet infeasible in ARM architecture. However, Intel microarchitecture (since P6) supports atomicity for such instructions even if the memory address is arbitrarily misaligned [55]. For example, CAS instructions of Intel ISA (e.g., lock cmpxchg) maintains memory access atomicity in all cases. The Intel official manual states that atomicity of lock is supported to arbitrarily misaligned memory.

Another important issue regarding unaligned memory access is the alignment fault. An alignment fault (which raises SIGBUS signal in Linux) occurs in the event of unaligned data memory access, depending on the CPU configuration. There are two configuration flags regarding the alignment fault in the Intel architecture, namely the AM bit in the system CR0 register and the AC bit in the EFLAGS register. Unless such bits are enabled together, Intel architecture does not raise an alignment fault. Table 2 summarizes the default configuration of these registers in well-known operating

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OS</th>
<th>CR0.AM</th>
<th>EFLAGS.AC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Windows</td>
<td>disabled</td>
<td>disabled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linux</td>
<td>enabled</td>
<td>disabled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSX</td>
<td>disabled</td>
<td>disabled</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 2: Default configuration of CR0.AM bit and EFLAGS.AC bit in major operating systems. Unless two bits are enabled at the same time, unaligned access does not raise an alignment fault under the Intel architecture.
TABLE 3: PERF benchmark revealed the reason of exceptionally high performance penalty of unaligned memory access that crosses the border of two pages, which is the increased cache miss.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Configuration</th>
<th># of Page-Faults</th>
<th># of Cache-Miss</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fully Aligned</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>7,647</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Breaking Cache Line</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>7,327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Breaking Page Border</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>7,618</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

systems.

However, there is an exception that raises an alignment fault regardless of such configuration. In the case of the Intel SSE [35] instruction set, an instruction such as MOVNTQDA raises an alignment fault if the target memory operand address is misaligned at a 16-byte boundary. Normally, an arbitrary heap memory address has no guarantee to be 16 byte aligned in general. Therefore, codes that use SSE instruction usually do not assume that the given memory address for SSE operand will be 16-byte aligned. The pre-processing codes of SSE instruction checks the address alignment and properly handles the 128-bit misaligned memory portion. However, some of the compiler optimization cases (e.g., Clang -O3) predicts the chunk alignment and raises problem. If such cases are rare, one solution could be ra-malloc installs alignment fault handler and catches such exception to emulate the operation. This emulation method is observed in ARM Linux kernel to handle unaligned access. We discuss this limitation with other details regarding the compatibility conflicts.

### 4.2 Microbenchmark for Unaligned Access

Unaligned access is often observed under Intel-based system. In recent Intel microarchitectures, the performance penalty of unaligned access is being reduced since Nehalem [65]. Here, we show microbenchmark results regarding unaligned access in recent Intel CPUs. All the per-instruction benchmarks are composed of assembly code only, thus avoiding any compiler dependency. We used ten different Intel x86-64 CPUs and measured the execution time of 134,217,728 (0x8000000) iterations for memory access instructions.

Performance measurement for instruction is dependent on CPU pipeline state. To make the worst-case CPU pipeline, we used the same instruction for 48 consecutive times and repeated such 48 consecutive execution using a loop. The loop was composed of dec ecx and jnz, both of which have lower instruction latency and reciprocal throughput compared to the memory access instructions. This configuration makes the worst-case CPU pipeline for memory access. Figure 7 shows the overall results. In the benchmark, only the register and memory were used as target operands (the immediates were not used since the instruction latency was lower).

Throughout the evaluation we have discovered that the performance penalty of unaligned access is severely biased by rare cases, Figure 7 is one of the experiment results. In particular, the performance penalty of unaligned access is 0% if the accesses have entirely occurred inside the cache line. In case the unaligned access broke the L1 cache line, the performance penalty raised up to 30–70%. In case the unaligned access broke the border of two 4-KByte pages, the performance penalty was suspiciously high (marked as red in the figure). In the case of REP-based instructions (REP counter value is 256), the performance penalty of unaligned access was mostly 20–30%. To investigate the reason for the exceptionally high-performance penalty of unaligned access that crosses page border, we further used the PERF [34] benchmark and found that the dominant factor is the increased cache miss. Table 3 summarizes the PERF benchmark conducted on the Intel i7-6700 Ubuntu14.04 Server in a 64-bit environment.

Thus far, the microbenchmark in Figure 7, suggests the performance penalty of unaligned access in modern Intel architecture is high only when the access crosses the border of two cache lines, and extremely high if the access crosses two-page boundaries.

#### 4.3 ra-malloc

According to the cycle-level instruction benchmark, unaligned access in L1 cache line border and page border hindered the performance. To avoid such memory access while enabling byte-granularity heap randomization, we implemented a byte-granularity randomized heap allocator suited for Intel architecture. The goal of this allocator is to randomize the heap chunk location with byte granularity while minimizing the unaligned memory access occurs at the border of L1 cache line and page boundary. We implemented ra-malloc as part of Clang runtime, and wrote an LLVM pass for automated allocator substitution.

To break the pointer-width allocation granularity, ra-malloc additionally allocates sizeof(void*) additional memory space in addition to original allocation request size to reserve sizeof(void*) dummy space. After the allocation algorithm selects the proper location for the new chunk, ra-malloc yields the address which is randomly increased in bytes between zero and sizeof(void*)-1. We note that the frontend implementation (adding random numbers) for applying byte-granularity randomization is a simple task and not our main contribution. The main contribution of ra-malloc is minimizing the impact of byte-granularity randomness based on the previously discussed analysis and experiments.

The backend allocation algorithm of ra-malloc is mainly based on jemalloc, where the heap space is organized as multiple pools each holding objects of certain size class. However, ra-malloc considers two special cases: (i) chunk size less than L1 cache line width, (ii) chunk size bigger than L1 cache line less than page size. The size of L1 cache line (usually 64-byte or 128-byte) is dynamically calculated during the allocator initialization and page size is statically assumed to be 4KB. Once the allocation size is determined, ra-malloc searches for an available chunk based on jemalloc algorithm with additional constraints that minimize the cases where chunks are spanning across special memory borders.

For object allocation smaller than L1 cache line size (including the additional space for randomization), ra-malloc guarantees the memory location of the chunk to fit between two L1 cache line borders thus eliminate any performance penalty due to byte-granularity heap randomization. In case
TABLE 4: Unaligned access penalty (in running time) of various memcpy implementations for 1-Mbyte buffer. “IfAA” stands for: Instruction used for Aligned Address. “IfUA” stands for: Instruction used for Unaligned Address.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CPU</th>
<th>OS</th>
<th>Compiler and Library Environment</th>
<th>Penalty</th>
<th>Alignment Handling</th>
<th>IfAA/IfUA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intel i7-6700</td>
<td>Windows 10</td>
<td>VS2015 vcruntime140.dll (32bit)</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>REP/REP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intel i7-6700</td>
<td>Windows 10</td>
<td>VS2015 (64bit)</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>SSE/SSE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intel i7-4980</td>
<td>Windows 8.1</td>
<td>VS2010 msvcr100d.dll (32bit)</td>
<td>-20%</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>REP/REP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intel i7-4980</td>
<td>Windows 8.1</td>
<td>VS2010 msvcr100d.dll (64bit)</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>SSE/SSE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intel i7-4980</td>
<td>Ubuntu 15.10</td>
<td>GCC 5.2.1 glibc-2.21 (32bit)</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>REP/REP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intel i7-4980</td>
<td>Ubuntu 15.10</td>
<td>GCC 5.2.1 glibc-2.21 (64bit)</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>REP/REP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intel i7-4980</td>
<td>Ubuntu 14.04</td>
<td>GCC 4.8.4 glibc219 (32bit)</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>REP/REP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intel i7-4980</td>
<td>Ubuntu 14.04</td>
<td>GCC 4.8.4 glibc2.19 (64 bit)</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>SSE/SSE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intel i7-4980</td>
<td>OS X El Capitan</td>
<td>Apple LLVM 7.3 (32bit)</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>REP/REP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intel i7-4980</td>
<td>OS X El Capitan</td>
<td>Apple LLVM 7.3 (64 bit)</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>REP/REP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intel i3-3770</td>
<td>Ubuntu 16.04</td>
<td>GCC 5.4.0 glibc-2.23 (64bit)</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>REP/REP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intel i5-3570</td>
<td>Fedora20</td>
<td>GCC 4.8.2 glibc-2.15 (64bit)</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>SSE/SSE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intel i5-3570</td>
<td>Debian7.5</td>
<td>GCC 4.7.2 glibc-2.13 (64bit)</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>SSE/SSE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intel i5-3570</td>
<td>FreeBSD9.1 (32bit)</td>
<td>GCC 4.2.1 bsdlibc (32bit)</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>REP/REP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intel i5-760</td>
<td>Ubuntu 12.04 Server</td>
<td>GCC 4.6.3 (32bit)</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>SSE/SSE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intel i5-760</td>
<td>Ubuntu 12.04 Server</td>
<td>GCC 4.6.3 (64bit)</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>SSE/SSE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intel i5-760</td>
<td>Windows 7</td>
<td>VS2010 msvcr100d.dll (32bit)</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>REP/REP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intel i5-760</td>
<td>Windows 7</td>
<td>VS2010 msvcr100d.dll (64bit)</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>SSE/SSE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 5: SPEC2006 benchmark results. Various allocators (including ra-malloc) are applied to each program. While other allocators respect word-alignment for all chunks, ra-malloc randomizes the chunk location with byte-granularity.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Benchmark</th>
<th>Default</th>
<th>ra-malloc</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>perlbench</td>
<td>648</td>
<td>631</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bzip2</td>
<td>832</td>
<td>835</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gcc</td>
<td>865</td>
<td>868</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mcf</td>
<td>1638</td>
<td>1646</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gobmk</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hmmer</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sjeng</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>libquantum</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h264ref</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>omnetpp</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>astar</td>
<td>321</td>
<td>367</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>xalancbmk</td>
<td>413</td>
<td>517</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (geomean)</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>110.38%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 6: Performance impact of the Nginx patch.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>requests/sec</th>
<th>Average</th>
<th>Standard deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Original</td>
<td>31362.20</td>
<td>565.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patched</td>
<td>31201.65</td>
<td>506.24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

the requested size is bigger than L1 cache line and yet smaller than page, ra-malloc places the chunk between page boundaries therefore avoid page boundary access. If the allocation size is bigger than a page, there is no additional handling as baseline allocator guarantees minimal border access without any additional handling.

In case the application is 32-bit, ra-malloc uses address filtering algorithm to handle the case of byte-shift-independent-pointers section 2 which could bypass ra-malloc. In case the requested chunk size is larger than 0x01010101 bytes, it is impossible to remove the byte-shift-independent address from the virtual address mapping. However, in case the size is smaller than 0x01010101 bytes, 32-bit ra-malloc ensures there would be no byte-shift-independent address inside the allocated chunk. The ad-
address checking algorithm is executed after the chunk selection and right before delivering the chunk to the application. If the chunk includes 32-bit byte-shift-independent address (e.g., 0x11111111), ra-malloc keeps the chunk internally and allocate a new chunk. The algorithm for address inspection is as follow: (i) Calculate most-significant-byte (MSB) of chunk start address. For example, if the chunk address is 0x12345678, MSB is 0x12. (ii) Check if MSB-only address (e.g., 0x12121212) is in between chunk start and end. (iii) Increase MSB by one and repeat step (i), and (ii).

Overall, the efficacy of ra-malloc would be optimal when all objects are small (less than L1 cache-line would be ideal). In reality, however, there are large heap objects. As the size of an object becomes bigger, the chance of having a costly unaligned access will increase even though ra-malloc minimizes the occurrence of unaligned access. To investigate the chunk size distribution in common applications in general, we traced heap allocation and de-allocation requests of Acrobat Reader and Internet Explorer. Figure 8 shows the object size distribution of live chunks when Acrobat Reader and Internet Explorer are running. The results are based on allocation/deallocation/re-allocation call trace. The left side graph in the figure is the result of Internet Explorer after rendering the Google index page, and the right side graph is the result of Adobe Reader after rendering an ordinary PDF document.

Figure 8 suggests that average heap chunk sizes are usually small. Byte granularity heap randomization using ra-malloc can fully avoid unaligned access penalty if all chunks are smaller than L1 cache line length. In case the chunk is larger than L1 cache line, it is inevitable to place a chunk across two cache lines. In general, large heap chunks are requested to allocate buffers that are often accessed by bulk-memory access APIs such as memcpy. To verify the detailed impact of byte-granularity heap randomization against memory intensive APIs and large buffers, we analyzed various versions of memcpy implementations and conducted experiments. In particular, we ran 100,000 iterations of 1-Mbyte memory copy operation using memcpy and compare the execution time between two cases: (i) source and destination addresses of 1-Mbyte buffer are word-aligned, (ii) source and destination addresses of the buffer is not word-aligned (byte-aligned). This experiment is NOT designed to measure the performance of unaligned access at the instruction level. Rather, the purpose of this experiment is to measure the performance impact and compatibility of unaligned access against bulk memory access APIs. Table 4 summarizes the results.

In Table 4, the performance penalty is negligible in most cases. However, a severe performance penalty is observed from the case of i5-3570 FreeBSD 9.1; and ironically, the case of i7-4980 Windows 8.1 shows negative performance penalty. The cause of such peculiar results can be explained by the fact that memcpy chooses a different version of implementation at runtime, depending on various parameters such as the address alignment, CPU features, size of the buffer, and so forth. Aside from the case of FreeBSD 9.1, all version of memcpy implementation detected the unaligned address and optimized the performance by changing the alignment to be aligned before beginning the actual memory access.

4.4 SPEC2006 Benchmark
To measure the performance impact and memory usage of ra-malloc under memory intensive environment, we use SPEC2006. The SPEC2006 benchmark suite did not suffer compatibility problem after we applied ra-malloc. However, measuring the performance impact of ra-malloc should be carefully conducted because existing software conventionally assume word granularity heap alignment, therefore some code could show unexpected behavior. In addition, the program might use multiple allocators or custom allocators thus render the experiment inaccurate.

Before applying ra-malloc allocator, we analyzed the source code of each benchmark suite to verify if the application is suited for the experiment. In case of 400.perlbench, custom heap allocator (Perl_safemalloc) was used depending on the build configuration parameters. However, we confirmed that under our build configuration, the benchmark used default glibc allocator (malloc). Similarly, 403.gcc had multiple custom allocators (xmalloc and obstack) but we checked that under our build environment, glibc allocator was used (obstack internally used xmalloc, xmalloc internally used glibc allocator). Other benchmark suites had no particular issues. All benchmark suite programs were also dynamically analyzed to confirm how many heap chunks are affected.

To change the allocator of SPEC2006 without manual code rewriting, we made an LLVM pass ra-malloc and used replaceAllUsesWith LLVM API to replace glibc C/C++ allocators such as malloc, free, _Znwj, and _ZdiPv. To measure the performance impact, we applied ra-malloc as well as other open-source allocators to SPEC2006. The open-source allocators we used are dlmalloc (glibc), tcmalloc, jemalloc, and obstack. The benchmark was conducted under the following environment: Intel(R) Xeon(R) E5-2630 CPU with 128GB RAM, Linux 4.4.0 x86-64 and Ubuntu 16.04. We used the glibc allocator as the baseline of performance. Table 5 summarizes the results. The average memory access overhead of ra-malloc is less than 5% considering it is based on je-malloc. Naive adoption of byte-granularity heap randomization against default libc heap imposes more than 10% memory access overhead.

5 Compatibility Analysis of Byte-Granularity Heap Randomization
Modern software and system implementations often assume and require the heap allocation alignment to be word aligned. Breaking this assumption can affect existing software in various aspects. In order to adopt byte-granularity heap randomization as practical defense, implementation conflicts regarding heap alignment should be addressed. To analyze the compatibility issues of byte-granularity heap randomization, we conducted experiments with various applications/benchmarks. Table 7 summarizes the analysis results regarding various compatibility issues.

5.1 Coreutils
After substituting Coreutils [47] glibc allocator to ra-malloc, we ran the Coreutils test suite to see if there are compatibility issues. In our initial experiment, 56 out of 476
Coreutils test cases did not pass the test. It turned out that programs using the following APIs crashed during execution: strdup, strndup, getenv, setdelim, asprintf, vasprintf, realpath, getcwd. After analyzing the root cause, we found that the reason was irrelevant to the byte-level allocation granularity. While our LLVM pass replaces the allocator calls in Coreutils, allocator calls inside libc remained. Since the above-mentioned libc APIs internally use default glibc allocator, two allocators have conflicted. To handle this issue, we ported such APIs to use ra-malloc allocator and extended the LLVM pass to replace such API calls as well. After porting the above-mentioned APIs for ra-malloc, all programs passed the test without causing any compatibility issues.

5.2 Nginx
We ran Nginx test suite after applying ra-malloc allocator. In our initial experiment, none of the 324 nginx-tests suite passed the check. According to our analysis, the root cause of the problem was the implicit assumption of heap chunk alignment in Nginx implementation. Because the code assumes that any heap object will be word-aligned, on some occasions the program chose to store boolean information inside the least significant bit (LSB) of pointers, perhaps for performance reason. That is, instead of declaring a boolean member in a structure or class, the boolean value is stored in the LSB of the object pointer.

Listing 1: Representative parts of the Nginx patch. LSB storage is replaced by a new member in ngx_connection_s.

```c
ngx_log_debug3(NGX_LOG_DEBUG_EVENT, ev->log, 0,
    "epoll add event: fd:%d op:%d ev:%08XD",
    @ -836,8 +841,7 @@ ngx_epoll_process_events(ngx_cycle_t *cycle, ngx_msec_t timer, ngx_uint_t flags)
    for (i = 0; i < events; i++) {
        c = event_list[i].data.ptr;
        - instance = (uintptr_t_t) c & 1;
        - c = (ngx_connection_t *) (uintptr_t_t) c & (uintptr_t_t) 1);
        + instance = c->instance;
        rev = c->read;
```

To handle this compatibility problem, we patched the Nginx-1.13.12 source code as shown in Listing 1. After the patch, all test suite passed the check. To evaluate the performance impact of ra-malloc-compatible modification against Nginx, we benchmarked the request throughput using wrk [50]. The benchmark was repeated 10 times for each case. Table 6 summarizes the benchmark result. According to the benchmark, no significant performance degradation was introduced by the modification.

5.3 ChakraCore
ChakraCore revealed interesting compatibility issues of byte-granularity heap randomization. We applied ra-malloc to ChakraCore then ran the standard test suite provided by the ChakraCore. The initial result indicated that all test cases failed to pass the check with the same error. The failure seemed irrelevant to the test case. We found that the initialization of ChakraCore JSRuntime accessed ra-malloc-affected chunk, however, the -O3 optimization of Clang aggressively assumed the alignment of the heap chunk (assuming it would be 128-bit aligned) then used SSE instructions that require specific memory alignment such as movaps for fast execution. After changing the optimization level to -O0, 351 over 2,638 test cases (interpreted variant) failed to pass the check.

Among the failures, 172 cases were caused due to SSE instruction alignment fault and 176 cases failed due to the assertion failure that explicitly requires word alignment for heap pointers before further operation. Interestingly, three cases failed due to time-out. After further analysis, we found that the failure was due to futex system call failure. Unlike pthread mutex, which is based on user-level lock prefixed instructions, the futex is based on Linux kernel system call which requires word-aligned address for its parameter. Because of this, the test suite failed to operate correctly as the system call raised an error. After finding this issue, we investigated the current (4.x) Linux kernel system calls to find a similar case. The futex was the only one that

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Application</th>
<th># failures</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coreutils</td>
<td>0/476</td>
<td>36 cases initially failed due to allocator substitution problem (fixed later)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nginx</td>
<td>324/324</td>
<td>All cases failed due to least significant bit (LSB) of pointer utilization issue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nginx (patched)</td>
<td>0/324</td>
<td>Re-factorization of LSB pointer issue made Nginx fully compatible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ChakraCore</td>
<td>72/2,638</td>
<td>Alignment Fault while using SSE (MOVAPS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ChakraCore</td>
<td>76/2,638</td>
<td>Assertion failure (alignment check)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ChakraCore</td>
<td>3/2,638</td>
<td>Futex system call failure (unaligned parameter)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 7: Compatibility Analysis Summary.
caused the problem with byte-granularity heap randomization. Overall compatibility analysis indicates that byte-granularity heap randomization requires high deployment cost.

6 LIMITATION

ra-malloc for ARM. The performance impact of unaligned access is a serious issue for RISC processors such as ARM. In general, unaligned memory access is strongly discouraged in RISC architectures. In fact, ARM architecture started to support hardware-level unaligned access for some instructions (e.g., LDR) since ARMv6. To investigate the feasibility of byte-granularity heap randomization in ARM, we conducted per-instruction memory access benchmark against Cortex-A9 and Cortex-A17. Table 8 summarizes the result. According to our analysis, ARM architecture since ARMv6 indeed supports hardware level unaligned access. However, the support is for only two memory access instructions (LDR, STR) and high-performance penalty is observed at every 8-byte address border regardless of L1 cache or page size. Instructions such as LDM shows over 10,000% performance penalty for unaligned access. The reason for such high penalty is due to the lack of hardware support. Since the hardware is incapable of executing LDM with unaligned memory operand, hardware raises fault signal and kernel emulates the instruction. In case of the VLDRA, even emulation is not supported by the kernel. Therefore the execution fails on unaligned memory operand. Most importantly, unaligned memory operand does not support LDREX instruction which is required for instruction level atomicity. For such reasons, ARM based system is inappropriate to consider byte-granularity heap randomization at this point.

Brute Forcing Attack. Byte-granularity heap randomization hinders the use of crafted pointer thus hinder exploits which depends on crafted pointers. The use of each crafted pointer involves 75% of defense probability in a 32-bit system and 87.5% in case of a 64-bit system. The defense probability will exponentially increase in case several crafted pointers are independently required for the overall attack. However, even such probability is insufficient to stop repeatable brute-forcing attack. In general, an invalid pointer dereference raises segmentation fault and crashes the program therefore attack is not repeatable. However, according to a previous work, there are special cases in which program survives even under segmentation fault and allows to repeat the attack.

Side Channel Attack. With byte-granularity heap randomization, heap pointers do not follow word-granularity. In average, 75% of heap pointers are not word-aligned. Assuming if the attacker is somehow able to measure the performance of dereferencing heap pointers precisely, she might be able to tell that some of them are misaligned around particular memory border. For example, the attacker can guess that a heap pointer is spanning across page boundaries while being unaligned if the access speed is relatively slow. So far, we fail to find any useful attack scenario by identifying such pointers. However, in theory, this can be considered as a potential side channel attack against byte-granularity heap randomization.

Implementation Conflicts. The adoption of byte-granularity heap randomization creates various implementation conflicts as discussed in section 5. However, one of the correctness problem among them is the use of LSB portion of heap pointer assuming the pointer is word-aligned. In section 5, we used Nginx for discussion; however we also found this issue in other applications as well. For example, Internet Explorer 11 uses the same implementation approach to mark the chunk type (Isolation Heap). Any programming techniques that rely on the assumption that the heap chunk has specific alignment cannot be applied with byte-granularity heap randomization at the same time. In addition, future is currently incompatible with ra-malloc as it requires a word-aligned address (other 4.x Linux system calls are not affected by alignment). Admittedly, the implementation compatibility issues are the major limitation for adopting byte-granularity heap randomization in practice as it requires significant engineering effort. However, we believe this is not a fundamental limitation that undermines the worth our research.

Information Disclosure using Byte-shift-independent Non-pointer Values. Byte granularity heap randomization imposes difficulty of hijacking pointers by breaking the sizeof(void*) allocation granularity of randomized chunk allocation. As the result of byte granularity randomness, an attacker cannot leverage pointer spraying technique for bypassing the randomized memory layout. The only option for reliable attack (other than information disclosure) is to rely on byte-shift-independent values, which make it hard (if not impossible with careful heap management) to craft valid pointers. But this is not the case for byte-shift-independent non-pointer values, which can allow an attacker to craft reliable memory corruption as intended and then escalate the attack further. A representative example would be string length corruption mentioned earlier in the paper section 2.

7 RELATED WORK

HeapTaichi. [43] shows various heap spraying techniques that leverage the allocation granularity of memory allocators. For example, if allocation granularity is fixed, an attacker can split nop-sleds into several pieces and stitch them together with jump instructions. HeapTaichi claimed that reduced allocation granularity in heap randomization is better for security. However, the minimal allocation granularity considered in HeapTaichi is pointer-width. Although HeapTaichi discussed in-depth heap allocation granularity issues, no discussion regarding byte-granularity allocation and its ramification regarding security/performance was made.

Address Space Layout Permutation. [58] adopts a high degree of randomness compared to the existing ASLR and also performs fine-grained permutation against the stack, heap, and other memory mapped regions. Heap randomization is not the main theme of this work. However, the paper includes descriptions regarding fine-grained heap randomization. To adopt fine-grained address permutation for a heap, a random (but page-aligned) virtual address
between 0 and 3 GB (assuming 32-bit memory space) is selected for the start of the heap. Afterwards, a random value between 0 and 4 KB is added to this address to achieve sub-page randomization. According to this method, heap pointers should have random byte-level alignment, which involves unaligned access problem. However, discussion regarding unaligned access (due to byte-level randomization) or the security effectiveness of byte-granularity randomization was not discussed despite ASLP covered a broad range of fine-grained randomization issues.

**Address Space Randomization.** [49] introduced fine-grained Address Space Randomization (ASR) for various OS-level components including heap object allocation. In this work, heap layout is effectively randomized by prepending random size padding for each object and permuting the sequence of allocated objects. The paper comprehensively explores various memory layout randomization strategies and propose various ideas regarding live re-randomization. They implement each randomization policies by patching the kernel and dynamic loader, or using binary code translation techniques. However, the security and performance impact regarding byte-level memory layout randomization is not the main interest of the paper. The main focus of the paper is comprehensive OS-level ASR and live re-randomization with a minimal performance penalty.

**Data Structure Randomization.** Data Structure Layout Randomization (DSLR) [59] randomizes the heap object layout by inserting dummy members and permuting the sequence of member variables inside an object at compilation time. The size of randomly inserted garbage member variable is multiple of sizeof(void*) thus respecting CPU alignment. The goal of DSLR is to diversify the kernel object layouts to hinder the kernel object manipulation attack performed by rootkits; in addition to thwarting the system fingerprinting and kernel object manipulation attack which relies on object layout information.

**Cling.** The isolation heap protection approach separates the heap into the independent area so that objects are allocated at different parts depending on their types. Indeed, these approaches can be observed in both academia and industry. Cling [37] identifies the call site of a heap chunk allocation request by looking into the call stack. If the chunk allocation request originates from the same call site, Cling considers the type of heap chunk to be the same, which indicates that it is safe to reuse the same heap area for those chunk requests. If the type is assumed to be different from two allocation requests, Cling does not allow the heap area to be reused between those requests. In practice, the heap isolation methods can frequently be observed in various security-critical software such as Internet Explorer, Chrome, and Adobe Flash [31].

**Other Heap Randomization Approaches.** Incorporating randomization into heap allocation has been discussed in numerous previous works. Some approaches, such as those of Bhatkar et al. and Qin et al., respectively randomize the base address of the heap, as shown in [39], [61]. Others randomize the size of the heap chunks, word-granularity location, allocation sequence and so forth [38], [40], [53], [56], [57], [60], [66]. From all these heap fortifications works including our paper, the purpose in adopting the notion as well as the implementation differs from each other. The advancement from previous works is that we show how byte-granularity heap randomization mitigates crafted pointer spray, then design an allocator that optimizes performance cost of byte-granularity heap randomization. Instead of locating the heap chunk at memory location unpredictable by an attacker, byte granularity heap randomization aim to obstruct heap exploits which require pointer-width allocation granularity.

**8 Conclusion**

In this paper, we show an in-depth discussion of byte-granularity heap randomization. At first, breaking the randomization granularity from word to byte can be considered trivial. However, this seemingly insignificant change in granularity opened up a surprising number of research issues regarding exploit mitigation, performance, and deployment. Our security analysis based on 20 real-world heap attacks demonstrated the effectiveness of byte-granularity heap randomization in various circumstances. After the security discussion, we show an in-depth performance analysis of byte-granularity randomization. Based on the performance analysis, we designed and implemented ra-malloc: an allocator optimized for byte-granularity heap randomization. The design of ra-malloc leverages recent advancement of post-Nehalem Intel architectures for handling the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Architecture</th>
<th>Instruction</th>
<th>Penalty</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cortex-A9</td>
<td>LDR/STR</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>penalty occurs at 8-byte border</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cortex-A9</td>
<td>LDRB/STRB</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>no penalty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cortex-A9</td>
<td>LDM/STM</td>
<td>over 40,000%</td>
<td>penalty always occurs, kernel emulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cortex-A9</td>
<td>LDM/STM (ThumbEE)</td>
<td>7,000%</td>
<td>penalty always occurs, kernel emulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cortex-A9 [A7]</td>
<td>VLDREX/STREX</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>alignment fault (no atomicity)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cortex-A9 [A7]</td>
<td>RDM/STM</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>alignment fault</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cortex-A17</td>
<td>LDR</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>penalty occurs on 8-byte border</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cortex-A17</td>
<td>STR</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>penalty occurs on 8-byte border</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cortex-A17</td>
<td>LDM/STM</td>
<td>over 2,000%</td>
<td>penalty always occurs, kernel emulation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 8: Per-instruction benchmark against ARM CPUs. The benchmark methodology is same to the Intel version.
misaligned access. In particular, ra-malloc considers specific allocation sites regarding cache line border. The compatibility analysis in this paper is based on ChakraCore, Ng-inx, and CoreUtils benchmarks. Unfortunately, compatibility analysis of byte-granularity heap randomization shows negative results.

9 Acknowledgement

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